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FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL 
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978.* BY J. Harvie Wilkinson III. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 1979. Pp. viii, 368. $17.95. 
"Brown may be the most important political, social, and legal 
event in America's twentieth-century history. Its greatness lay in the 
enormity of injustice it condemned, in the entrenched sentiment it 
challenged, in the immensity of law it both created and overthrew'' 
(p. 6). From Brown to Bakke narrates the nation's uneven accep-
tance and the Supreme Court's unsure implementation of Brown v. 
Board of Education. 1 The narrative's plot: the Supreme Court's at-
tempt to integrate education, beginning with Brown and cµlminat-
ing, twenty-two years later, in Regents of the University of Cal!fornia 
v. Bakke.2 Its characters: the nation's highest court, students black 
and white, local school boards, NAACP attorneys, well-meaning so-
cial scientists, much-harried federal district court judges, and, of 
course, the forces of evil, personified in figures like former Arkansas 
Governor Orval Faubus. Its theme: like many tales of Milton and 
Blake, this book studies the loss of innocence. 
The Supreme Court's innocence was manifested in the 
unanimous Brown opinion, where integration and racial equality 
seemed so eminently attainable, a simple matter of judicial decree 
and reliance on the children (" 'I have seen them do it,' Thurgood 
Marshall told the Court in Brown. 'They play in the streets together, 
they play on their farms together, they go down the road together, 
they separate to go to school, they come out of school and play ball 
together'" (p. 41)). That innocence was but a memory by the time of 
the "brokered judgment" (p. 298) in Bakke, where the Justices strug-
gled in several opinions to maintain some semblance of support for 
affirmative action, seemingly the last, best hope of blacks seeking 
educational and social parity in the Land of Promise. 
J. Harvie Wilkinson attributes this loss of innocence, this change 
in spirit from Brown to Bakke, to two forces. In grand fictional 
form, one force was internal, personal to the Court, and thus in some 
sense less excusable. The other was impersonal, finding its expres-
sion in two disheartening racial clashes generated by the inner logic 
of the Court's sweeping attempt to integrate education. 
The Supreme Court's personal failing, Wilkinson believes, was in 
not standing behind the "all deliberate speed" language of Brown 
• This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Review.-Ed. 
I. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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II.3 He argues forcefully, if ultimately unpersuasively,4 that Brown 
II was itself correct. In his view, gradualism - "a course of steadily 
mounting federal pressure, which allowed the South its :filibusters 
and fulminations, but all the while forced private reckonings that 
Southerners were, after all, a part of the nation" (p. 68) - was the 
proper course. But from 1955, the year of Brown II, until the 
landmark Green5 decision in 1968, the Supreme Court virtually 
abandoned the field of school desegregation it had so promisingly 
staked out. Implementation was left to the forty-eight federal district 
judges in the southern states and, to a lesser degree, to,the Fourth 
and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Supreme Court's failure to 
supervise this implementation contributed largely to the uneven and 
uninspired progress of integration. 
Wilkinson describes the Court's unsure implementation of Brown 
- rather than demanding substantial integration, "it pleaded, medi-
ated, mollified, or even withdrew" (p. 310) - but he fails to explain 
it. He emphasizes that the Supreme Court is a pragmatic institution, 
both reflective of and responsive to the political environment in 
which it operates, and he notes that "[i]n almost all the landmark 
school cases, white racial sensibilities weighed heavily" (p. 310). But 
he never clearly explains why this pragmatic institution cared so 
much about white racial sensibilities. 
Perhaps the Justices feared that a "desegregation now" order 
would provoke outbreaks of violence that would threaten life and 
property. Perhaps they feared that such an order would leave black 
children with a pyrrhic victory - desegregated education that was 
valueless in the face of white hostility. Or perhaps they were con-
cerned that outright defiance would reveal the Court's powerlessness 
to enforce its own judgment. 
Whatever the reason for the Court's failure, it did not stay above 
the fray forever. In 1968, in Green v. County School Board, it an-
nounced that its attempt to integrate education would be "deliber-
ate" no longer. Yet Wilkinson contends that this victory over the 
internal force was not adequate to prevent the loss of innocence. 
The promises made in Brown could not be ful:filled by judicial fiat; 
the logic of the Brown decision itself generated clashes that forced 
the Court to confront the complexity of America's racial problem. 
Brown stood for several propositions. On the one hand, its 
message was that minorities have a right to equal educational oppor-
tunity, and segregated classrooms and instruction do not provide 
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
4. Cf. Black, The U'!finished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH, L. REV. 3, 22 (1970) 
(arguing that Brown II undermined respect for fundamental law by asking blacks to postpone 
enjoyment of a right the Supreme Court had just declared was constitutionally theirs). 
5. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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that equal educational opportunity. But America's neighborhoods 
- particularly in the urban North and West - were as segregated as 
its schools. Practically speaking, if Brown required integration, it 
also required busing. But Brown also stood for the primacy and cen-
trality of education in American life, and for many, particularly mid-
dle- and lower-class urban whites, education meant safe, secure 
neighborhood schools. These ideals inevitably clashed and rekin-
dled the fears and hatred that Brown had hoped to still. In the 1974 
Detroit busing case6 - the first school case lost by black plaintiffs in 
the Brown era7 -the Supreme Court resolved the clash in favor of 
the neighborhood. For Wilkinson, the decision was a "great gamble 
. . . that black progress would continue in the absence of an activist 
judiciary" (p. 242). It was also a sign that the loss of innocence 
would not be pretty. 
Brown stood for still another idea - the color-blind Constitu-
tion. 8 In its purest form, such an ideal is irreconcilable with affirma-
tive action programs that seek to remedy the educational 
disadvantages of past prejudice by treating minorities preferentially. 
The clash between the ideal of color-blindness and the ideal of equal 
educational opportunity also found its way to the Supreme Court, 
first in .DeFunis and finally in Bakke. 
With Bakke, the Court's loss of innocence was complete. The 
long moralistic voyage begun with "optimism and confidence" had 
reached a stage of "confusion and doubt" (p. 308). WilkiLson's dis-
cussion of the Bakke decision is slightly less insightful than his anal-
ysis of the busing decisions, in part, perhaps, because it was written 
so soon after the event. But while he hedges in expressing his per-
sonal opinion on busing, Wilkinson's judgment on Bakke shines 
through clearly: 
Perhaps there has never been a case before the Supreme Court with 
opposing arguments of more equal legitimacy. The Court's own task 
in Bakke was to avoid a conclusive outcome. . . . 
The Court did just that. If Brown was a great moral blow, Bakke 
was a brokered judgment. The Supreme Court offered "a Solomonic 
compromise," in which "the nine justices spoke in many voices, a cho-
rus of competing viewpoints adding up to a well-modulated counter-
point". [P. 298.] 
From Brown to Bakke is elegant and engrossing. It loses none of 
its penetration for being written in clear and simple prose, and it 
loses none of its winsomeness for including a heavy dose of professo-
rial legal analysis. One of the most engaging aspects of the narrative 
6. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
7. There followed a rash of others. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 
406 (1977); Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
8. The phrase was coined by the elder Justice Harlan in lone dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). 
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is the liberal sprinkling of anecdotes. For example, Wilkinson de-
scribes Virginia Governor Linwood Holton's politically courageous 
decision in 1973 to send his children to black-majority public schools 
in Richmond in hopes of lessening resistance to desegregation orders 
in that race-tom city. We also learn that Marco DeFunis, two short 
years after escaping the notoriety that would forever belong to Allan 
Bakke,9 filed an amicus brief on Bakke's behalf for the Young Amer-
icans .for Freedom. 
Perhaps, as Professor David Chambers suggested in an earlier 
review, Mr. Wilkinson writes "generally with the detachment of a 
person telling someone else's tale," 10 and perhaps the book suffers as 
a result; but I do not think so. For while its narrator may be de-
tached, his story is ours. As the black minority shared the humilia-
tion, so must the white majority share the shame. Together we must 
face an uncertain future: 
From Brown to Bakke has been a maturing journey also. Findings in 
the education cases laid bare the depth of American prejudice and 
made clear the true dimensions of our difficulties. We now seem to be 
many sad and wise days away from those happy forecasts of play-
ground bliss. What we better understand is our own lack of under-
standing. School integration has taught us at home what Vietnam did 
abroad: how much eludes the American capacity to reshape. [P. 308.] 
9. DeFunis was, in 1971, in a position similar to that of Allan Bakke. However, he was 
admitted to the University of Washington Law School while his appeal from an unfavorable 
state supreme court ruling was pending. Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it 
declared the question before it moot when it became apparent that DeFunis would graduate 
regardless of the outcome of the case. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per 
curiam). 
10. Chambers, Clashes in the Classroom, Wash. Post, July 8, 1979, § E, at 1, col. I. 
